situation, the theoretical scarcity of Stalinism as an intellectual frame influencing legal representation as well as the discursive power of nationalist ideology already embedded in the legal framework.
In order to approach the legal and constitutional confusion reigning in the interregnum emerging at the end of World War 2, I shall first address the conceptual framework of the state of exception as developed in the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. This step seems necessary first as a matter of historiographical inquiry inasmuch as Agamben's paradigm is able to underline the ambiguous status of legal discourse in the interwar and World War 2 Romanian context, that of both being caught in the totalitarian maelstrom and of positively taking part in the reign of state sanctioned violence. Second, as a matter of jurisprudential inquiry, the concept of exception enables us to circumvent, even if only provisionally, the entrenched theoretical positions of reading the law in totalitarian contexts as a 'legislative monstrosity' 7 , 'statutory lawlessness' 8 , or 'laws [that] may be law but
[are] too evil to be obeyed' 9 , which, each in their own way, tend to eschew law's manifold embeddedness in a modernity gone awry. It might also compel us to reflect on the legal and political nature of such regimes and avoid semantic and legal confusions that all too often insinuate themselves in the analysis of totalitarianism 10 .
Last, and this time as a matter of critical inquiry, the paradigm of the exception could be at least serviceable in offering a map of the areas in which law, understood as a structured symbolic discourse, fails in articulating and thus limiting historical violence. 
Beyond the Law: the State of Exception
To begin with, the state of exception is a limit-concept for legal theory inasmuch as it questions the basic assumptions of continental legal thought and disturbs the cardinal distinction between the normative and the descriptive. As
Agamben argues, 'exceptional measures […] find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures which cannot be understood in legal terms'
11
.
His analysis, finds its departing point in the somewhat peculiar juridico-political structure present in constitutional practice and constitutional framework of the Western tradition since eighteenth century 12 consisting in either the suspension of constitutional guarantees or of the whole constitutional process for a series of actions taken by state authorities with the aim of protecting the constitutional order.
By focusing at this ambiguous practice of going beyond the law in order to uphold its mere existence, Agamben defines the state of exception as a zone of indistinction in the structure of the law 13 , thus isolating a conceptual area where it is logically impossible to make any relevant distinction between law and fact. It is through this "suspension" of the legal, that a zone of indistinction between fact and norm, between force and form, is opened within the fabric of the symbolic framework that would have otherwise been arguably able to sustain the distinction between law and violence and ultimately between politics and life
14
. The constitutional system of the interwar could be safely termed as 'semiauthoritarian'
34
, and was one that decidedly relied on a constant recourse to The fact that the communist movement was in charge of the prosecution and conviction of the crimes is of course not surprising inasmuch as Soviet troops were present in Romania and the movement was slowly trying to rebuild its presence in public life. The situation provided also the Communists with the opportunity not only to tackle the issue of the authoritarian and fascist state violence to which most of them would have been victims, but also create their basis for a new legitimising framework. To put it simply, in contradistinction to the authoritarian dictatorships of the late interwar the Communist movement had the chance to present itself as a guardian of democracy and a bearer of an authentic democratic ethos -after all the Communist party was part of the National Democratic Bloc. This is not to say that the trial of war criminals was mainly a matter of communist politics. Rather my claim is that the way in which the actions of the authoritarian regimes were legally framed as crimes in the early years of postwar through an intricate process 63 Crampton, Eastern Europe in the XXth Century and After, at 225. symbolisation in which national ideology and state responsibility played a key role.
A notable part of the politico-legal context of the time was held by the shifting role of the Communist movement, which was the main proxy between the established power in Bucharest and the 'Allied (Soviet) High Command'.
Whilst the framing of the Statute seeking to address Romania's participation in the war and the atrocities committed is rather ambiguous in terms of criminal law wording, as, for instance, the responsibility is defined in relation to persons rather than with acts, while the crime of 'bringing the disaster upon the country' is not defined anywhere else 64 , it also hints to a series of other constitutional and ideological underpinnings. Indeed, the choice of words is symptomatic inasmuch as 'country' (țara) was by no means a criminal law category and hardly a modern constitutional one. Whereas in common language the country and the state might be interchangeable, under the already modern Romanian legal system of the time, 'the country' did not have a proper juridical meaning. It had, however one specific meaning as a constitutional archaism traceable back to the Middle Ages -that is the constitutional body which ultimately legitimized the Prince in the elective monarchies of 14-18 th century 65 . Given that Antonescu used the term Conducător (Leader) in defining his office -which was already a constitutional archaism as it evoked one of the offices of the Voyvod title of the Middle Ages -it can be inferred 64 Article 1 defined those 'guilty of the disaster brought on the country' as a) persons who had backed Hitler or espoused fascism and who bore the political responsibility for allowing German troops to enter Romania; and b) persons who had given their support to the above deeds, either in speech, writing or by any other means. Article 2 proclaimed those 'guilty of the disaster brought on the country through the commission of war crimes' as persons who had taken the decision to declare war on the Soviet Union and the United Nations, who had treated prisoners in an inhuman manner, who had ordered or carried out acts of terror or cruelty against the population in the war zones, who had taken repressive measures against civilians out of racial or political motives, and who had ordered forced labour or the deportation of people. , 2001 ), at 88 where the author emphasizes the discontinuity between the 'country' and the 'state', the first one being a distinct entity which played a key role in the dialectics of power between the prince and the nobles.
that it was the country, that is the constitutionally organised 'people' which had suffered the tort of dictatorship. In other words, the passive subject of the crime is already the legally constructed 'people', understood here as an abstract legal body.
In this sense, not only the state reframes itself through the process of criminalisation, but also restates and redefines the people as a constitutive part of the polity.
The postwar trials developed in this legal framework have been regarded by commentators as a rather problematic attempt in dealing with the trauma of the war and in assigning responsibilities 66 . It has thus been noted the limited extent of the scope of the war trials, the courts leniency towards some of the convicts as well as the random application of the law over territory especially in those areas in Northern
Transylvania which during the war had been part of Hungary. As Maria Bucur points out, it can be noted a tendency in avoiding to deal with Romanian responsibility for the atrocities which was backed by an ideological conviction that responsibility lied within the foreign former allies -Nazi Germans and fascist Due to its importance, and especially to its high coverage in media, the communist faction in charge now with the machinery of justice organized the trial with care. As noted, the members of the Court and the accusers were carefully chosen through members of the party, access to the trial was limited to a selected audience, and special measures for keeping order were taken. . There were a series of accusations, organized around the lines of the actions of the former Marshal and of the legal framework that was into force. They concerned namely the unlawful war against the Soviet Union, the terror unleashed against workers and peasants, the 'German colonization of Romania', the economic disaster, the massacres, the deportations and the campaign of 'Romanianisation' 69 .
As we can notice, only a part of the accusation dealt explicitly with atrocities of the regime directed against its citizens and against inhabitants of the occupied territories, while the others were referring clearly to the abstract legal entity of the 'country'. expressionless victims, but to an abstract legal community which is through the very act of uttering of this words founded on a fundamental ethical confusion.
However, the central legal, political and semiotic problem here is not the responsibility of the Conducător, but the dynamics through which 'the country' receives its innocence by losing the Conducător. What the Trial is telling to the state and to the anonymous collaborators of the dictatorship is that most of them were victims themselves. Through accepting this complicity in the field of social reality, the legal order creates its 'people', its 'country' as it imagines them to be: 'We are a modest people who never had expansionist tendencies. We had a sole mission: that of preserving our national being of a modest and working people, who never went out of its borders, who never did barbaric acts and always defended its land and its national being' structure the power relations. The law doesn't judge historical violence, because ontologically it is inscribed in a history of violence. As Walter Benjamin noted, 'all
[law] was the prerogative of the kings or of the nobles -in short of the mighty; and that, mutatis mutandis, will remain as long as it exists' 74 . As law is consubstantial with historical violence, addressing it legally is deemed to fail, except under a possibility to judge history itself, and thus to cut off with a tradition that instills that history should be that of the victors. The law, surpassed by mythical violence, fails to bring justice. What we are given in fact is the reproduction of the same mechanism of a culture tainted by barbarism, and linked inescapably to it, a mechanism of mythical violence 75 reproducing itself under the masks of the revolution from above.
Conclusion
The trial of Antonescu, taken as a paradigmatic example of judging the past and constructing the new regime of legality, fails to address the material history of the Holocaust and the manifold forms through which the state as such participated in the criminal enterprise. By devising legally the crime as a tort against an abstract legal community that is already founded by the state, it came short in questioning the basic tenets of law's and state part in the dissolution of the polity. This decision had dire ethical consequences -some of which I tried to point out here. It also had further political consequences as long as by seeking to legitimize itself through an ethical confusion, the Communist movement itself moved away from the tenets of international communism. It has symbolically embraced the national route, inasmuch as it renounced to its revolutionary stand and joined the sphere of statedriven politics. Furthermore its legal consequences are even more compelling, for the focus on personal dimension of the perpetrators -even if accurate -prevented a
